Performance Information and the Politics of Bureaucratic Autonomy
Working paper co-authored with Poul Aaes Nielsen
In this paper, we use data from a survey experiment with more than 1.000 Danish local politicians to show that reactions to performance information in terms of how much autonomy politician's wish to grant to public schools depend predictably on ideological convictions. Drawing on, and consistent with, theories of delegation, we show that politicians on the left and right react differently to the same performance information.
Old Habits Die Hard, Sometimes: History, Administrative Traditions, and Civil Service Politicisation in Europe
International Review of Administrative Sciences
In this paper, I argue that 18th centry state infrastructure matters for politicisation of positions in present-day central administrations in Europe. In particular, a history of bureaucracy is necessary for de-politicised civil service management in Western Europe. The same does not hold in Eastern Europe, where administrative history is much more fragmented.
The paper can be accessed at the publisher here.