PUBLIC SECTOR RECRUITMENT AND HRM

Civil Service Laws, Merit, Politicization, and Corruption: The Perspective of Public Officials from Fice Eastern European Countries

Public Administration, co-authored with Jan Meyer-Sahling

In this paper, we use survey data from more than 1.400 public servants in five Eastern European countries to show that, in these respondents perceptions, recruitment and corruption are linked. In particular, merit recruitment is associated with less corruption, whereas politicisation of positions is associated with more corruption.

The paper can be accessed at the publisher here.

Civil Service Management and Corruption: What We Know and What We Don’t

Public Administration, co-authored with Jan Meyer-Sahling and Christian Schuster

In this paper, we review existing theory and evidence on the impact of civil service management and human resource management on corruption. We discuss recruitment, remuneration, personnel transfers, promotions, job stability, and tenure protection, finding that for all but a few of these topics, much more empirical research is needed.

The Causal Effect of Public Service Motivation on Ethical Behaviour in the Public Sector: Evidence from a Large-Scale Survey Experiment

Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, co-authored with Jan Meyer-Sahling and Christian Schuster

In this paper, we use experimental data from our survey of Chile's central government to show that public service motivation is positively associated with an important form of ethical behavior: whistleblowing. Using a question order experiment, we show that activating PSM among respondents results in higher whistleblowing intention but only among respondents with a substantial level of PSM to activate. The paper is among the first to experimentally manipulate PSM and thus contributes with its design as well as its results.

On the effectiveness of anti-corruption tools: Perspectives from civil servants from two East European countries

Working paper, co-authored with Jan Meyer-Sahling

In this paper, we use data from a survey of public officials in Poland and Latvia to study whether these officials link disclinary codes and ethics codes to corruption. We find that the two types of codes work best in combination but only when the ethics code seeks to set aspirational standards rather than punitively backed regulation.

A previous version of the paper can be downloaded here.

Civil Service Examinations, Favouritism and Public Service Motivation: Evidence from a Large-Scale Survey of Civil Servants in Chile

Working paper, co-authored with Jan Meyer-Sahling and Christian Schuster

In this paper, we use data from our survey of Chile's central government to show that entry examinations are positively associated with public service motivation. Moreover, using item count regression we are able to show that this association is robust to the inclusion of favouritist recruitment processes that exams are intented to reduce. Furthermore, we provide some evidence, though rather weak and suggestive, that respondents who are recruited through a favoritist process may have lower levels of PSM.

Public Service Motivation in Differing Political Systems

Working paper, co-authored with Jan Meyer-Sahling and Christian Schuster

In this paper, we use data from an original survey of more than 15.000 public servants from ten countries around the world to perform the largest-ever descriptive analysis of public service motivation (PSM). We show that PSM is common across a range of contexts, from OECD members Chile and Estonia to underdeveloped Nepal and Malawi. Moreover, we find that - counterintuitively but consistent with prior research on smaller, less diverse samples - PSM is more common in less developed, less democratic, and more corrupt settings. These findings point to important differences in PSM dynamics at the individual and system level.

Mediating the Resource Curse: The Effects of Oil Revenue on Bureaucrats in Ghana and Uganda

Working paper, co-authored with Adam Harris, Rachel Sigman, Jan Meyer-Sahling and Christian Schuster

In this paper, we use experimental data from our survey of Ghana and Uganda's central governments to examine mechanisms linking oil revenue in developing countries to poor and politicized governance. Using a priming experiment, we find evidence that - contrary to standard rentier theory - effects on politicized bureaucracy and citizen orientation are heavily contextual and strongest among bureaucrats not supporting the ruling party.